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On 6 July 2009, the Minister of Police, Nathi
Mthethwa, launched the Directorate for Priority
Crime Investigations (DPCI), led by Deputy
National Commissioner Anwa Dramat. The DPCI
replaces the Directorate for Special Operations
(DSO) as the country's elite criminal investigation
unit. Like the Scorpions, the new directorate has
been given an attention-worthy nickname, the
'Hawks'.
In many respects the Hawks will pick up where
the Scorpions left off. At least this is the message
the Minister has tried to convey to the public,
symbolised in the official handing over of 288
Scorpions case files to Dramat at the unit's
launch.1 Mthethwa has said that the Hawks will
inherit another 351 cases, and that 218 of the
former 244 remaining Scorpions investigators
have joined the new unit.2 These statements and
the handover ceremony are important,
considering the context of scepticism surrounding
the establishment of the unit. 
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South Africa's new elite police unit, known as the Hawks, has been created in the midst of political
change. Objectors have criticised its location in the SAPS, saying that the integrity of the unit, and its
ability to conduct politically neutral investigations, may be compromised by its location. Legislation
enabling the unit's formation provides for measures to test the integrity of its members. This legislation
will need to be coupled with effective leadership characterised by integrity if the unit is to live up to and
exceed the image and accomplishments of its predecessor, the Scorpions.
Launched in 1999, the Directorate for Special
Operations (better known as the 'Scorpions') was
formed through the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA) Amendment Act 61 of 2000,
locating the unit in the NPA, itself part of the
Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development. Mandated with investigating
serious organised and priority crimes, the
Scorpions employed a unique prosecution-led
approach to investigations, employing teams
comprised of prosecutors, investigators and
information-gathering analysts. The unit was
widely revered for the effectiveness and integrity
of its members, and for its high prosecution rate. 
Against its brief record, government's February
2008 announcement of plans to dissolve the
Scorpions and create a new unit within the South
African Police Service (SAPS) was widely
opposed by opposition parties and a group of
ANC members.3 The ANC justified the move
stating that by combining the Scorpions and the
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SAPS Organised Crime Unit and locating the new
unit in the SAPS, the state would be better
equipped to suppress organised crime.4 This was
despite the recommendation by the Khampempe
Commission of Inquiry into the mandate and
location of the DSO that the unit remain in the
NPA (see South African Crime Quarterly No 24,
June 2008 for a number of articles relating to the
reasons for the closure of the Scorpions). 
By April 2008 closure of the Scorpions took on
momentum as allegations were made of it being a
rogue structure among the state's security
apparatus. As the then ANC Chief Whip (now
Minister of Police), Nathi Mthethwa put it at the
time: 
The correct mandate of the Scorpions was
sacrificed on the altar of the advancement of
narrow political agenda by the former
apartheid agents, evident in the operational
style since its inception. The ANC's decision on
the incorporation of the Scorpions into the
SAPS will strengthen the fight against crime by
ensuring the integration of all policing
functions under a single structure. This is
consistent with Chapter 11 of the Constitution.5
The ANC's stance grew in popularity among
sections of the ANC-supporting public who saw
the Scorpions as unfairly targeting members of
the ruling party, in particular its would-be
president, Jacob Zuma. Opposition parties and
civil society groups continued to condemn the
move as irresponsible and an abuse of power until
6 April 2009 when evidence suggesting political
interference by Scorpions head Leonard
McCarthy was made public. The evidence in the
form of electronic recordings allegedly reveals
McCarthy and then NPA head, Bulelani Ngcuka,
strategising around the timing of re-charging
Zuma. In announcing the NPA's subsequent
decision to withdraw charges against Zuma,
National Director Mokotedi Mpshe commented:
In the present matter, the conduct consists in
the timing of the charging of [Jacob Zuma]…
Mr McCarthy used the legal process for a
purpose outside and extraneous to the
prosecution itself… Mr McCarthy, who was
head of the DSO, and was in charge of the
matter at all times and managed it almost on a
daily basis, manipulated the legal process for
purposes outside and extraneous to the
prosecution itself…. What Mr McCarthy did
was not simply being over-diligent in his
pursuit of a case, it was pure abuse of process.6
The emergence of the tapes subdued opposition
to the Scorpions' dissolution, and smoothed the
way for the establishment of the Hawks.
However, the allegations against McCarthy have
received little public attention and the former
Scorpions are still remembered favourably in
many quarters.
Perhaps the most contentious element of the
Scorpions-Hawks transition is the location of the
new unit within the South African Police Service.
While most South Africans perceived the Justice
Department-based Scorpions as highly
trustworthy, efficient and independent, the SAPS
(located in the Ministry of Police) still struggles
to win the confidence of significant portions of
the population. Although often unsubstantiated,
a rich public discourse relating to perceived
corruption in the SAPS is saturating the country.7
The fact that former National Commissioner of
Police and political appointee, Jackie Selebi, is on
trial for corruption and fraud has not helped
matters. While the Scorpions had led the
investigation against Selebi, the Hawks, as part of
the SAPS, will report directly to the new National
Commissioner. This apparent lack of
independence was cause for concern among
critics of the new unit's structure. 
SHAPING THE HAWKS
The SAPS Amendment Act of 2008 provides for
the establishment of the DPCI. In an attempt to
ensure the integrity of the new unit and assuage
public concerns over lack of independence, the
Amendment Act provides strict guidelines for
integrity, recruitment, accountability, and the
transfer of powers from the DSO to the DPCI.
Some of these represent significant improvements
when compared to the NPA Act.
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With regards to the founding of the unit,
subsection 17b of the Act reads (emphasis added
by the authors):
In the application of this Chapter the following
should be recognised and taken into account: 
(a) The need to establish a Directorate as a 
Division of the Service to prevent, combat
and investigate national priority offences,
in particular serious organised crime,
serious commercial crime, and serious
corruption
(b) The need to ensure that the Directorate – 
(ii) has the necessary independence to 
perform its functions
AND
(iv) is staffed through the transfer, 
appointment, or secondment of
personnel whose integrity is beyond
reproach
At the unit's launch, Dramat said that 1 700
potential members from the Commercial Crimes
Unit, the Organised Crime Unit and the Hi-Tech
Centre, had been screened for admission to the
Hawks, and that another 1 300 would be screened
over the next year. These statements suggest an
attempt on the part of the SAPS to ensure and
highlight the (intended) integrity of the unit.
These intentions are supported by strict
recruitment and vetting procedures allowed for by
the amended Act. 
Section 17(e) of the Act, titled 'Security screening
and integrity measures' provides a legal
framework for the standards of integrity by which
the unit will operate – a crucial element by which
it will be judged. According to this Act, any
person considered for appointment to the unit
will have to undergo a security screening
investigation, and may undergo further screening
at any time, as illustrated by the following excerpt
(emphasis added by the authors):
(1) Any person who is considered for 
appointment in, or secondment to, the
Directorate, shall be subject to a security
screening investigation in terms of and in
accordance with section 2a of the National
Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No.
39 of 1994). 
(2) No person may be appointed to the 
Directorate unless – 
a. A security clearance has been issued 
to that person in terms of section
2a(6) of the National Strategic
Intelligence Act, 1994, by the Head of
the Crime Intelligence Division of the
Service; or
b. A security clearance on the required 
level and which is still valid has been
issued to the person in question in
terms of section 2a(6) of the National
Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994; or
c. A temporary security clearance has 
been issued by the Head of the Crime
Intelligence Division of the Service
after the person had submitted an
application to the Head of the Crime
Intelligence Division to have a
security screening investigation
conducted.
(3) Any appointment on the basis of a 
temporary security clearance shall be
subject to the finalisation of the security
screening investigation and the issuing of
a security clearance in terms of section
2a(6) of the National Strategic Intelligence
Act, 1994.
(4) Whenever the Head of the Crime 
Intelligence Division of the Service in terms
of section 2a (6) of the National Strategic
Intelligence Act, 1994, upon reasonable
grounds, degrades, withdraws or refuses a
security clearance, the National
Commissioner may transfer such person
from the Directorate, or if such person
cannot be redeployed elsewhere in the
Service, discharge him or her, subject to
the provisions of section 34. 
(5) A member of the Directorate may from 
time to time, or at such regular intervals as
the Head of the Directorate may determine,
be subjected to a further security screening
investigation.
(6) If, upon information at the disposal of the 
Head of the Directorate, he or she
reasonably believes that the person
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concerned poses a security risk, he or she
may require the member to undergo a
further security screening investigation.
(7) a. Any member of the Directorate must, 
in the prescribed manner and at the
prescribed intervals, disclose his or her
prescribed financial and other interests
and those of his or her immediate family
members.
b. For the purpose of paragraph (a) 
'immediate family members' refers to
the spouse, civil partner or permanent
life partner of that member and
includes dependent children of and
dependent family members living in
the same household with that member. 
(8) a. The Minister may prescribe measures 
for integrity testing of members of the
Directorate, which may include random
entrapment, testing for the abuse of
alcohol or drugs, or the use of polygraph
or similar instrument to ascertain,
confirm or examine in a scientific
manner the truthfulness of a statement
made by a person.
b. The necessary samples required for any 
test referred to in paragraph (a) may be
taken, but any sample taken from the
body of a member may only be taken
by a registered medical practitioner or
a registered nurse. 
c. The Minister shall prescribe measures 
to ensure the confidentiality of
information obtained through integrity
testing, if such measures are prescribed
in terms of paragraph (a).
Implemented responsibly and correctly, Section
17(e) could firmly bolster the integrity of the
Hawks, both by helping to prevent members
vulnerable to corrupt, criminal or dishonest
behaviour from entering the unit, and by raising
the likelihood of their exposure, should members
pursue self-enriching illicit activities. Paragraph 8
(a) in particular, with its provision for random
integrity tests,8 including entrapment and
polygraph tests, adds a new and important
dimension to the governance of the unit. Similar
provisions applicable to the broader service would
significantly bolster the tools available in the
organisation's efforts to restrict corruption in its
ranks. However, concern has been raised that the
strict recruitment and screening criteria could be
abused to prevent former Scorpions and other
members perceived as politically incompatible
from entering the unit.9
Section 17(e) effectively constitutes negative
preventative measures. They represent necessary
but hard-line, sometimes invasive and potentially
threatening tools through which the SAPS can
monitor Hawk members. On the other hand,
good, positive management cannot be legislated
but will be imperative if the integrity of Hawks
members and their actions are to be maintained.
Integrity is to an extent influenced by morale,
making it important that the SAPS manage the
personal transitions of members from other
units into the Hawks, most importantly those
moving from the Scorpions for whom the
relocation might at first be viewed as a career
regression. 
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT 
One of the primary tasks of managers in any
organisation or unit is to shape the actions of
employees to serve the organisation's interests.10
Leaders can influence the values and actions of
those around them through strategic emphasis of
select rules, laws and, in particular, behaviours.11
Through their actions, managers set the 'moral
tone' for subordinates to follow.12 Depending on
the integrity and outlook of the leaders this may
result in either positive or negative outcomes. 
At some level 'integrity' can be considered a
relative concept. Parry and Proctor-Thomson
point out that to many in his party, Hitler would
have been a man of impeccable integrity, despite
his actions being grossly unethical.13 In this vein
it will be the actions and behaviour of Hawks
leaders and members that will be most important
in establishing and maintaining an image of
unshakable integrity. This can be achieved by
employing the 'hard' targeted interventions
allowed for by the Act, such as security vetting,
and integrity and polygraph tests, but also by
20 Institute for Security Studies
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employing 'soft', culture-forming strategies. Both
these avenues rely on good, ethical leadership.
Cele, Dramat, and senior Hawk leadership need
to 'define the reality' of the Hawks through
instilling a vision based on sound values, and
constructing an organisational reality around that
vision.14
ORGANISATIONAL VALUES
The SAPS is an enormous (180 000+)
organisation composed of members representing
almost every aspect of South African society. As
such, its organisational culture is influenced by
the principles and values of the broader
government and society.  
Values are understood as being learned,
predominantly during childhood, and generally
reflect the normative interpretations of right and
wrong within a particular societal context.15 This
poses a challenge in South Africa where it has
been said the country suffers from 'moral decay'.
At the 2008 National Anti-Corruption Summit
Archbishop Tlhagale ended his address stating
that 'a widespread practice of crime and
corruption precipitates society into a state of
moral decay at the expense of the wellbeing of
society itself '.16
Immanuel Kant's principle-based approach to
ethics posits that the value of an act is determined
by the principle on which it is performed. He
believed such an approach would mitigate against
violations that might occur through action based
on unsound values. In this sense, documents like
the South African Constitution and the SAPS
Code of Conduct serve as platforms of principles
from which the Hawks should operate. However,
members of an organisation or unit such as the
Hawks often come to their posts already
socialised to a particular moral system. If, in this
context, managers fail to capitalise on these
divergent beliefs to create a strong, shared vision,
fractures in moral culture emerge, and ethics blur.
Police members who torture suspects in order to
garner information may believe they are
performing a necessary evil.17 In 2009 alone,
members of SAPS organised crime units have
been arrested for torture and murder, as well as
for involvement in drug smuggling.18 There is also
some evidence that torture may not be
uncommon in these units.19 As organised crime
members will make up a significant proportion of
Hawks personnel, these matters should be flagged
and monitored as leadership shapes the values of
the new unit.
LEADERSHIP IN CONTEXT
The Hawks were formed in the midst of, and will
continue to be shaped by, political change. In late
2008 the ANC Chief Whip, Nathi Mthethwa, was
appointed as Minister of Safety and Security
(renamed Ministry of Police in April 2009).
Various attempts to retain the Scorpions were
made by civil society groups and opposition
parties (and in one case a private individual). A
national election was held, Jacob Zuma was
elected as president of the country, the Scorpions
were disbanded, and a new National Police
Commissioner, Bheki Cele, was appointed to
replace the former commissioner, who is on trial
for corruption. President Zuma, Minister
Mthethwa and Commissioner Cele have all
expressed a desire to step up government's
response to crime, at times using strong tones.
How these attitudes and accompanying rhetoric
will contribute to the moulding of the Hawks has
yet to be seen, but should be watched.
In December 2008, four months before being
sworn in as president, Jacob Zuma called for
amendments to legislation that would allow for a
more punitive response to crime:
I am convinced that within the parameters of
the Constitution there is significant space for us
to toughen legislation against all forms of
criminality… Criminals must know that
breaking the law will have severe consequences
and that they'll suffer as a result of their
actions… [We need] adequate and long
sentences that fit the crimes that are
committed.20
Minister Mthethwa was quoted in November
2008 as saying:
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We don't believe that, when you are faced... with
criminals armed with sophisticated weaponry,
the police task would be to take out some
human rights charter… We need to see how do
you have a combination and a balance of human
rights culture, but at the same time be effective
as police…. [and] We are saying to the police…
teach those people a lesson – fight fire with fire.
There's no other way on that.21
On the day he was appointed national
commissioner of police, Bheki Cele expressed his
view that 'Cowboys never cry... We need to be
tough. You can't be soft and you can't be moving
around kissing crime. You need to be tough
because you're dealing with tough guys.'22 A week
later he expressed his intention to ask parliament
to review Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures
Act relating to police use of lethal force. He said he
did not want police to 'hesitate' before shooting.23
Speaking of a hypothetical police encounter with
an armed robber, Cele said 'Either [the criminal]
acts correctly or we bury him…we must relook
[at] how to allow police to do their work. We are
not encouraging rookies or cowboys but we are
not handcuffing police to die alone.'24
Speaking at the launch of the Hawks the unit's
head, Anwa Dramat, formerly an ANC
underground operative and Western Cape deputy
police commissioner, reportedly told the audience
he had been given a mandate to 'crush organised
crime without mercy'.25
These excerpts reveal a pattern in the discourse of
the new leadership, one that coincides with the
establishment of the country's new elite police
unit. There are high expectations of the Hawks,
and they must be managed responsibly if they are
to retain their integrity. The risk exists that
managers could place unrealistic expectations on
members, or members could put unrealistic
pressure on themselves, which could result in
corner-cutting integrity violations. Through
research in corporations Clinard found that top
managers sometimes pushed their subordinates so
hard that the only way to meet their expectations
was through illegal practices. He concluded that in
some organisations members were socialised into
participating in corporate lawbreaking.26 Though
not empirically proven, evidence of similar trends
emerged within the SAPS in mid-2009 when it
was revealed that some police stations were
manipulating crime statistics. Such manipulation
has been partially blamed on the former
commissioner's overemphasis on crime trends as
a measure of performance, and his alleged public
humiliation of managers who could not contain
the rise in crime in their precincts.27
There exists then a risk of what Goodpaster calls
'goal sickness' for the Hawks – inconsistencies
between organisational goals, means and values,
and this rhetoric.28 Similarly, the vision of the unit
(as shaped by its leadership) must not fall outside
the values and norms of society at large. Its
actions and goals should transcend personal and
organisational goals and foremost be legitimate
within the societal context.29 According to
Worden:
Integrity [conforms] strategic planning to the
principles in the vision. Integrity rids the vision
of principles and values that are too far
removed from the survival needs of the
organisation, owing to the nullification of
hypocrisy in integrity… Integrity demands that
one's principles are in one's plans and actions.30
CONCLUSION
Against what was at first significant public and
political resistance, the Scorpions, renowned for
their integrity and effectiveness, were disbanded
in the first half of 2009. The location of the
Scorpions' successor, the Hawks, within the South
African Police Service has been met with
widespread criticism, primarily due to fears over
the autonomy of the new unit. The Democratic
Alliance called the move an 'excessive
centralisation of power'.31 Fears also stemmed
from public perceptions that the SAPS, unlike the
Scorpions, suffered widespread corruption. 
In a country where perceptions of rampant crime
and moral degeneration abound, the Scorpions
represented hope for many citizens. It will be an
important victory for the Hawks and the SAPS as
22 Institute for Security Studies
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= (accessed 4 August 2009).
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police corruption and abuse carried in the country's
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measurements of trust in police were illustrated in a 2006
Afrobarometer survey. A 2007 ISS Victim Survey
suggested improvements in perceptions of police
effectiveness since 2003 but still reflected significant
perceptions of mistrust, corruption, and cooperation with
criminals by police. A forthcoming paper based on
research by this author suggests that perceptions of
widespread corruption within the SAPS are held by most
members of the organisation. 
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in which members are unknowingly placed in situations
specifically constructed and monitored to gauge the
integrity of their actions. 
9 A Minnaar, The Scorpions Lose their Sting: Challenges 
to incorporation of the DSO into the SAPS, South African
Crime Quarterly, 24 (June 2008), 23-28.
10 A Sinclair, Approaches to Organisational Culture and 
Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics, 12 (1) (1993), 63-73.
11 K Lasthuizen, Leading to Integrity: Empirical Research 
into the Effects of Leadership on Ethics and Integrity, PhD
dissertation, Amsterdam: VU University, 2008.
12 L Huberts, M Kaptein & K Lasthuizen, A study of the 
impact of three leadership styles on integrity violations
committed by police officers, An International Journal of
Police Strategies and Management, 30 (4), 587-687.
13 K Parry & S Procter-Thomson, Perceived Integrity of 
Transformational Leaders in Organisational Settings,
Journal of Business Ethics, 35 (2) (2002), 75-96.
14 The concept of managers 'defining reality' is taken from 
DuPree 1989, Nanus 2002 and Morgan 1986 cited in 
S Worden, The role of Integrity as a Mediator in Strategic
Leadership: A Recipe for Reputational Capital, Journal of
Business Ethics, 46 (1) (2003), 31-44.
15 W L Richter & F Burke (eds.), Combating corruption, 
encouraging ethics: a practical guide to management ethics,
2nd edition, New York: Rowman & Littlefields Publishers,
Inc., 2007.
16 Towards an integrated national integrity framework: 
consolidating the fight against corruption: report on the
third national anti-corruption summit, National Anti-
Corruption Forum: Pretoria, 2008.
17 As illustrated by the 'softening up' or torture of inmates 
at the US prison, Abu Ghraib, since the 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center in New York.
a whole if the new unit can establish a similar
reputation for itself. The SAPS Amendment Act
provides an important legal foundation upon
which the unit's architects and leaders can build a
unit centred on integrity. But the form the unit
eventually takes will depend on the vision and
integrity of its leadership; their ability to mould a
single culture based on sound ethical values; as
well as on the successful achievement of the tasks
put to them and the delivery of expectations. 
The management of integrity within a unit like
the Hawks needs to form part of an overall
strategic plan. Members of the Hawks are being
drawn from a number of specialised SAPS units,
including Organised Crime, some of which have
themselves been exposed for involvement in
criminal acts. It is important that SAPS members
accepted into the Hawks share the same core
values, and that these values mirror those laid out
in the SAPS Codes of Conduct and Ethics. 
The country has a new president, a new minister
of police, a new police chief and a new elite unit
with what appears to be the legislation and
resources at its disposal to develop into something
impressive. If successful, the Hawks may serve to
motivate and raise morale throughout the
organisation as members on the ground claim
affiliation with the unit, and possibly strive to join
it. The legislation is in place, the baton has been
passed and members are being screened. It now
remains for leadership to realise their vision for a
new elite crime-fighting unit, founded on
integrity, in which all South Africans can vest
their hope. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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